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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, vast numbers of Salvadorans who completed a
long and arduous journey to the United States in search of safety
have been quietly returned to El Salvador.' Many of the United
States citizens who were aware of the massive deportations were
forced to choose between obedience to civil authority and obedi-
ence to their religious principles which mandated that they protect
innocent human life. Those who chose to protect life, acted upon
their religious convictions, and founded the sanctuary movement.
In 1984, a church worker was charged with unlawfully trans-
porting three undocumented Salvadoran aliens in violation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act2 which prohibits the transporta-
tion of illegal aliens within the United States. John Elder, the di-
rector of the church-sponsored refugee shelter, Casa Romero,3 pro-
vided sanctuary to Central Americans fleeing political persecution.
Elder filed various motions to dismiss, some of which were based
on freedom of religion, and domestic and international refugee law.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas denied the motions and held: neither the free exercise of
religion clause of the first amendment nor domestic or interna-
tional refugee law prohibited prosecution of a United States
church worker for providing sanctuary to illegal aliens. United
States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
The events leading to this decision are significant. Immigra-
tion policy, political events, and public sentiment are of particular
importance. These forces have culminated in a crusade aptly de-
scribed as the sanctuary movement. In order to provide an under-
standing of the reasoning behind the district court's decision, this
comment will briefly survey events giving rise to the movement.
Second, this comment will analyze the grounds for prosecution of
sanctuarians and defenses. Third, this comment will examine and
evaluate the freedom of religion defense raised in Elder. Finally,
this comment will evaluate the impact of the sanctuary movement
on U.S. jurisprudence and society.
1. Comment, Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United
States, 47 U. Pirr. L. REV. 295, 296 (1985).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1982).
3. Casa Romero, named in honor of Oscar Romero, an assassinated Roman Catholic
Archbishop of El Salvador, was founded in 1982 and provides assistance and shelter to Cen-
tral Americans who have fled from their homeland to the United States.
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II. THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT
The sanctuary movement consists of groups of church workers
who provide shelter and transportation to Salvadorans who have
entered the United States in violation of the immigration laws.
The movement has quickly gained widespread publicity and sup-
port: in February 1983, there were approximately twenty churches
offering public sanctuary and refuge.' By January 1985, there were
over 180 sanctuaries, with over 60,000 church members who sup-
ported the movement.' While the sanctuary movement is associ-
ated most closely with the Catholic Church,6 other religious
groups, including Protestants, Quakers, Presbyterians, and Jews
have offered their support.
The first sanctuaries were independent units dispersed pri-
marily throughout southwestern Texas and California. Currently,
the heart of the sanctuary movement is in California, where sanc-
tuaries are concentrated in San Francisco and Los Angeles. The
sanctuaries have formed a network of common alliances as the re-
sult of increased pressure from the opposition and increased public
awareness.
Although the movement began as a coalition of loosely-knit
groups, it has acquired cohesion as a result of the recent wave of
government prosecutions against sanctuary workers for transport-
ing and harboring illegal aliens. The government views the sanctu-
ary movement as a usurpation of governmental authority to regu-
late immigration policy. The church workers are thus being
prosecuted as common alien smugglers who transport aliens into
the country for a fee.
The church workers' principal defense is that the refugees
have a right to asylum in the United States by virtue of the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.' The church
workers contend further that under the Refugee Act of 1980,8 the
Salvadorans qualify for refugee status because of their well-
founded fear of persecution stemming from their adherence to par-
4. L.A. Daily J., July 20, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
5. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 29, 1985, at 4, col. 3.
6. The historic role of Catholicism in Central and South America is the primary expla-
nation given for the predominance of Catholic involvement in the sanctuary movement.
7. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (1967).
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
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ticular political ideologies or membership in a particular social
group.9 Therefore, the sanctuarians maintain, they are only assist-
ing political refugees who would be entitled to enter this country
legally under the U.S. laws defining refugee status.
The sanctuary movement and the government also differ in
their respective beliefs regarding the motives of the Salvadorans
who seek to enter the country. The government asserts that the
Salvadorans, like the majority of other immigrant groups, are seek-
ing admission to the United States for economic reasons: the flight
of the Central Americans is an attempt to achieve a better eco-
nomic way of life by utilizing alleged political persecution to their
advantage." Leaders of the movement, on the other hand, respond
that political motivations of the Salvadorans are of paramount
concern, asserting that a "well-founded fear" of persecution exists.
They argue that, notwithstanding any immigrant's desire for a bet-
ter life, the Salvadorans qualify as political refugees.
A. Immigration Policy
The sanctuary movement is a product of changing immigra-
tion policy and foreign affairs, and is further shaped by constitu-
tional limitations and political processes. Congressional power over
immigration stems from two sources: the express constitutional
provision conferring such authority in article I, section 8, clause 3
of the United States Constitution," and the more obscure source
of Congressional power to regulate immigration found within the
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
10. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has been reluctant to grant ap-
plications for political asylum by Salvadorans because of their possible economic motives. In
1984, the INS granted only 328 applications of 13,373 applications for political asylum made
by Salvadorans. For example, on January 4, 1985, the INS denied the application of a
twenty-nine year old Salvadoran who petitioned for political asylum contending he had been
kidnapped and tortured as a result of his participation in the Salvadoran teachers' union.
The INS, while sympathizing with the applicant's suffering, ruled that his claim was not
unique since the persecutions were not confined to a particular group, but are imposed on
all. L.A. Daily J., Feb. 5, 1985, at 4, col. 3. See also Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th
Cir. 1984)(the tragic and widespread danger or violence affecting all Salvadorans was not
persecution sufficient to support a showing required for political asylum).
11. The constitution provides that Congress shall have the power "to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." U.S.
CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 3. This provision was inserted, apparently, as a solution to the immigra-
tion situation under the Articles of Confederation. The Articles of Confederation provided
that each state had authority to regulate and enact its own immigration laws. ART. CONFED.
art. 4.
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concept of sovereignty; the United States as a sovereign nation del-
egates responsibility for immigration policy to the federal
government.
1. Historical Perspective
While Congress was granted the power to regulate immigra-
tion under the constitution, early congresses did not invoke this
power. The individual states controlled immigration according to
their own rules until the middle of the nineteenth century. A sig-
nificant force in eroding state power to regulate immigration oc-
curred in 1849, when the Supreme Court ruled certain state stat-
utes which imposed taxes on incoming aliens unconstitutional."
Not until 1882, however, did Congress take advantage of its power
to control immigration by passing the first federal immigration
law.' 3
Congress initially took an expansive view of immigration con-
trol. The need for cheap labor during the Industrial Revolution
was a major motivation behind the open door policy. By the early
twentieth century, however, Congress took a restrictive view to-
wards immigration and implemented a system of quotas, which re-
stricted immigration based on the immigrant's national origin.
This restrictive approach combined with totalitarian regimes of the
twentieth century culminated in a great number of people seeking
entry into the United States under refugee status.
2. Refugee Act of 1980
The Refugee Act of 1980 was intended to furnish an orderly
procedure for processing and admitting refugees.' 4 One of the
objectives of the act was to provide a comprehensive statutory defi-
nition of the term "refugee." Other goals of the act included pro-
viding new quotas for the admission of refugees and for granting
12. Norris v. City of Boston, 48 U.S. 282 (1849).
13. The Chinese Exclusion Acts (22 Stat. 58), suspended Chinese immigration to the
United States for 10 years. The acts were extended again in 1892 (27 Stat. 25) 1902, (32
Stat. 176) and 1904 (33 Stat. 394, 428). The propriety of the Acts would be litigated a few
years later in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)(broadly mapping the
powers of Congress with respect to immigration and the exclusion of foreigners).
14. Congress declared that the Act is to provide "a permanent and systematic proce-
dure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the
United States . 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (1982)(congressional declaration of policies and
objectives).
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political asylum. The act also established resettlement procedures.
The act defines a "refugee" as an individual outside the coun-
try of his nationality or habitual residence who, because of a "well-
founded fear of prosecution on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group or political opinion" is
unable or unwilling to return to that country." This new definition
expanded the scope of refugee status because it allowed an immi-
grant to claim refugee status based on nationality or membership
in a social group. In contrast, the act defines an "asylee" (a person
applying for asylum) as an alien physically present in the United
States or at a border. 6 To qualify for asylum, a refugee must
demonstrate refugee status. 7 A one year period of asylum is au-
thorized with the possibility of renewal, contingent on the political
conditions of the original country. 8
The act expressly provided for the admission of 50,000 refu-
gees a year during 1980, 1981, and 1982." After 1982, the presi-
dent, after consultation with Congress, is required to determine
the number of refugees allowed to immigrate. This number must
be justified by humanitarian concerns or must otherwise be in the
"national interest. '20 This language suggests that the act is in-
tended to facilitate a balance between political events and U.S. for-
eign policy.
B. Foreign Policy Towards El Salvador
The civil strife in El Salvador is the paramount reason for the
growing sanctuary movement. El Salvador's oppressive regime be-
gan in 1977, when General Carlos Humberto Romero ascended to
the presidency following sham elections," in which voters were in-
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
16. Id. § 1158.
17. Id. § 1158(a).
18. Id. § 1159(a).
19. Id. § 1157(a)(1). It is interesting to note that this limitation was not applied to the
Cuban boat people who arrived on U.S. shores in 1980 as a result of the "Freedom Flotilla."
These estimated 125,000 Cubans entered the United States as "special entrants" outside the
framework of the Act. SELECT COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 93
(1981).
20. Id. § 1157(a)(1).
21. Fisher, Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy, 4 HuM. RTs. Q. 1, 1
(1982).
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timidated at the polls and ballot boxes were stuffed. "2 When the
defeated candidate, Colonel Ernesto Claramount, denounced the
election, protests began and approximately 100 people died as a
result of military fire.2 ' These series of events began a reign of ter-
ror which was to torment El Salvador in the years to come. Since
that time, horrendous tales of murder, torture, and rape have been
reported.24
1. The Carter Administration
Initially, the United States Department of State condemned
the regime. The Carter administration treated human rights as the
paramount concern of U.S. foreign policy.2 The Carter administra-
tion began a vigorous crusade against violations of human rights in
El Salvador. The administration delayed naming a new Ambassa-
dor to El Salvador and sent the Head of the Human Rights Divi-
sion of the State Department to investigate the situation.26 Mili-
tary and economic assistance to El Salvador was reduced as a
further message to General Romero. 7
The administration relied on two laws, namely the Foreign As-
sistance Act 28 and the International Financial Institutions Act2 to
achieve these goals. In July 1977, Washington postponed approval
of over ninety million dollars in loans from the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank, insisting that it would only relinquish its ap-
proval pending a reduction in human rights violations.3 0 However,
when the eight month siege of military force was lifted following
Romero's inauguration, the loan was approved and a new ambassa-
22. C. ARNSON, EL SALVADOR: A REVOLUTION CONFRONTS THE UNITED STATES 34 (1982).
23. R. ARMSTRONG & J. SHENE, EL SALVADOR, THE FACE OF REVOLUTION 88 (1982)[here-
inafter R. ARMSTRONG].
24. Fisher, supra note 21.
25. Carter's emphasis on respect for human rights was based on avoiding mistakes of
the past. He was insistent upon dismissing the memory of Watergate and Vietnam, and
sought to introduce morality into foreign affairs. R. ARMSTRONG, supra note 23, at 95.
26. Id.
27. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1979
321 (1980).
28. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982). The Act prohibits security assistance to any country which
"engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights." Id. § 2304(a). The Act cuts off economic aid to any country guilty of human rights
violations. Id.
29. 22 U.S.C. § 262g-3 (1982). This act compels the United States representative to
lending institutions to vote against loans to repressive governments.
30. R. ARMSTRONG, supra note 23, at 95-96.
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dor was appointed.3 1
The Carter administration continued to watch the situation in
El Salvador. The Organization of American States (OAS) visited El
Salvador in January, 1978 and reported the existence of torture
and repression. 32 By February, 1979, the Department of State
presented a human rights report of its own to Congress. 33 El Salva-
dor was no longer a pressing concern, however, because problems
with Costa Rica and Nicaragua became paramount.3 4
Concern over the Salvadoran situation was renewed in the fall
of 1979 when the Romero regime was overthrown by military of-
ficers.3 5 The military junta initially proposed changes in the eco-
nomic situation of El Slavador by redistributing land ownership
and wealth.36 While these goals were sincere, military officers suc-
ceeded to key positions and denounced reform. Leftist groups con-
demned the new junta. During the first week of the new govern-
ment, approximately 160 people died during police attacks.3 7
Two juntas took control of El Salvador in the six months be-
tween October 1979 and March 1980. U.S. involvement in the re-
gion grew with the increasing U.S. commitment to control the vio-
lent upheaval El Salvador was experiencing." The State
Department sent warnings to the rightist groups to refrain from
conspiratorial activities.3 9 The administration supported the ruling
junta because it was trying to restore order and provide a middle
ground between the rightist groups and the oligarchy which op-
posed land reform, and the Liberal Christian Democrats. " Concern
over the crisis in El Salvador mounted when four U.S. citizens,
three nuns and a lay person, were murdered on December 2,
1980.41 President Carter immediately suspended all aid and sent
an investigative team to the country to probe into the facts of the
incident.42 Circumstantial evidence was clearly present despite the
31. Id. at 97.
32. Id. at 106.
33. Id. at 108.
34. Id. at 109.
35. C. ARNSON, supra note 22, at 41.
36. Id. at 42.
37. Id. at 43.
38. Id. at 50.
39. E. BALOYRA, EL SALVADOR IN TRANSITION 127 (1982).
40. R. ARMSTRONG, supra note 23, at 157.
41. The brutality of the murders increased public awareness of the situation in El Sal-
vador. Id. at 176; C. ARNSON, supra note 22, at 64-65.
42. R. ARMSTRONG, supra note 23, at 177.
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lack of direct evidence linking the murders to government officials
or the military.
The Salvadoran government was reorganized following the
murders and Napoleon Duarte, a civilian, was named president by
the junta.43 The State Department demonstrated its approval of
the Duarte government by providing twenty-five million dollars in
economic aid.44 In his last three days in office, Carter renewed mili-
tary aid to El Salvador in excess of five million dollars."5 This ac-
tion caused public outrage; the State Department regarded the ac-
tion as a personal affront against a human rights victory. Carter
explained that his policy reversal was required due to information
obtained which revealed that the guerrillas were receiving arms
and training from Communist countries." The State Department
vowed to support the Salvadoran government in opposing left-wing
terrorism. Twenty U.S. military officers were sent to train Salvado-
ran officers in counterinsurgency techniques."7
2. The Reagan Administration
When Ronald Reagan came into office in January, 1981, his
administration quickly dispensed with the aura of human rights
which had permeated the Carter administration. Specifically, Rea-
gan "dropped all pretense of tying aid to reform. '4' Reagan's pol-
icy bolstered the local military in its efforts to maintain order. The
public and Congress viewed U.S. military advisors' presence in El
Salvador as reminiscent of Vietnam and charged Reagan with vio-
lation of the War Powers Act."' Reagan's anti-communist stance
hardened in an attempt to prevent a leftist victory, but support for
the Duarte government continued.
The Reagan administration has met with strong public criti-
cism in the area of human rights. Reagan has consistently recog-
nized the Salvadoran situation as a "textbook case" of communist
oppression. 0 As a result, the Reagan administration's foreign aid
43. C. ARNSON, supra note 22, at 66.
44. R. ARMSTRONG, supra note 23, at 177.
45. Id. at 188.
46. Id.
47. C ARNSON, supra note 22, at 69.
48. R. ARMSTRONG, supra note 23, at 189.
49. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 1543(a)(1) (Supp. 1973). The act requires notification to Con-
gress when U.S. military is sent to hostile nations. Id.
50. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE IN
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programs are tied to the political alliances between the United
States and the country involved in the insurgency. A blatant exam-
ple of Reagan's insensitivity to the Salvadoran human rights viola-
tions occurred in November, 1983. Reagan vetoed legislation which
provided that military aid to El Salvador would only be furnished
upon assurance by the President that the human rights situation
had improved."
Congress passed Section 728 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 198152 which required the Presi-
dent to certify that the government of El Salvador was complying
with human rights standards. For two years, Reagan complied.
When the certification provisions expired, however, and a bill was
introduced to extend the certification procedure, Reagan refused to
sign the bill. Members of Congress filed suit in federal court chal-
lenging the validity of the veto.5 3 In addition, Congress brought
suit" against President Reagan, urging that the President's policy
of providing military assistance to El Salvador was violative of the
prohibition on granting aid to "any country. . .which engage[s] in
a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights." '5 The district court dismissed the suit, on the
grounds that review would improperly interfere with the political
process. The dismissal was affirmed by the court of appeals.
The Reagan administration's policy on human rights is inher-
ently inconsistent, flawed, and lacks understanding and moral sen-
sitivity. The Reagan administration's policy draws a sharp distinc-
tion between communist and non-communist regimes. Human
rights violations by communists are vehemently opposed, while
non-communist strife is tolerated. Examples of this inconsistent
treatment are evidenced by Reagan's show of military force in Gre-
nada and the bolstering of naval forces near Libya, as a warning
against terrorism. Yet with El Salvador, the administration has re-
fused to recognize that the Rightist regime, to which the U.S. is
EL SALVADOR, Spec. Rep. No. 80, at 8 (1981).
51. See H.R. 4042, 98th Cong., lst Sess., 129 CoNG. REc., H777 (Daily ed. Sept. 30,
1983).
52. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub.L. No. 97-
113, § 728, 95 Stat. 1519, 1555-57 (1981) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1982)).
53. See Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163 (D.D.C. 1984), revd sub- nom., Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
54. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd per curiam, 720 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
55. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1980).
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supplying arms, is more dangerous than the Leftist insurgency
which is simply advocating democratic reform.
C. Current Perspectives
As with any controversy, the sanctuary movement has its sup-
porters and opponents. Several legislators, while not publicly con-
doning the movement's approach, have indirectly supported its
objectives. Several House and Senate bills have been proposed urg-
ing that Salvadorans be granted temporary legal residence.56 The
legislation would allow extended voluntary departure for
Salvadorans in the United States for approximately two and a half
years, until an investigation is made of the conditions of displaced
persons. At that time, Congress would be empowered to make per-
manent decisions on asylum for Salvadorans. While this legislation
would limit deportation of refugees already within the United
States, the prosecutions of sanctuary workers would not be
eliminated.
The sanctuary movement recently instituted stronger means
to spread its message. In May, 1984, approximately eighty religious
refugee groups sued the federal government to enjoin criminal
prosecution of sanctuary workers.5 7 The suit was initiated not only
to stop prosecution of sanctuary workers, but also to increase pub-
lic awareness of the situation. By this gesture, the sanctuary work-
ers transformed the debate into a political controversy.
The sanctuary movement is opposed not only by the Justice
Department, but also by conservative citizen groups. For example,
protesters gathered outside a federal courthouse in Brownsville,
Texas urging the convictions of sanctuary workers. The group,
which calls itself "Concerned Citizens for Church and Country,"
believes the Soviet Union is backing the sanctuary movement in its
56. See, e.g., S. 377, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 822, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
The principal sponsors of the bills are Rep. Joseph Moakley (D-Mass.) and Sen. Dennis
DeConcini (D-Ariz.). As of April 3, 1985, the Moakley-DeConcini bills had 18 co-sponsors in
the Senate and 139 co-sponsors in the House. The bill is based on 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) which
gives the Attorney General authorization to withhold deportation of an alien to a country
which would subject him to persecution. Interpreter Releases, Mar. 1, 1985, at 187; Inter-
preter Releases, Apr. 5, 1985, at 331.
57. The suit, American Baptist Churches v. Meese, No. C85-3255RFP, filed in U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California also requests that the Court should de-
clare that refugees have a right to remain in the United States until human rights violations
cease in El Salvador and Guatemala. See L.A. Daily J., May 8, 1985, at 21, col. 1.
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acts of opposition to U.S. foreign policy in Central America.5"
III. SANCTUARY PROSECUTIONS AND DEFENSES
A. United States v. Merkt
One of the first sanctuary prosecutions involved Stacey Lynn
Merkt.ss Merkt was a church worker at Casa Oscar Romero which
offers food and housing to Central American refugees. Merkt as-
sisted two illegal aliens from El Salvador, in 1984, by driving them
from Casa Romero to a farmhouse in another city where they
spoke with an American reporter; the aliens planned to go to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) office in San
Antonio. Border Patrol agents intercepted, arrested and charged
Merkt with transporting and harboring illegal aliens in violation of
federal law."0 Merkt was convicted and given a suspended sentence
of ninety days; the court suspended execution and instead placed
the defendant on two years probation.6'
On appeal, Merkt argued that the government had failed to
establish a prima facie case. In order to establish a violation of
section 1324(a)(2), the government must prove (1) the defendant
transported or moved an alien within the United States; (2) the
alien was within the United States in violation of the law; (3) the
58. L.A. Daily J., Feb. 2, 1985, at 5, col. 3. For an interesting explanation of the sanctu-
ary movement, see 14 STUD. LAw. 25 (1986).
59. United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985).
60. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that:
(a) Any person including the owner, operator, pilot, master commanding officer,
agent or consignee of any means of transportation who -
(2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law or having reasona-
ble grounds to believe that his last entry into the United States occurred less
than three years prior thereto, transports, or moves, or attempts to transport or
move, within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in fur-
therance of such violation of law; ...any alien, including an alien, crewman,
not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or
reside within the United States under the terms of this Chapter or any other law
relating to the immigration or expulsion of aliens, shall be guilty of a felony, and
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both, for each alien in re-
spect to whom any violation of this subsection occurs; provided, however, that
for the purposes of this section, employment (including the usual and normal
practices incident to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring.
8 U.S.C. § 324(a)(2) (1982). For the legislative history and purpose of this section see 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADM. NEWS, at 5566; see also 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADM. NEws, at
2577.
61. Merkt, 764 F.2d at 269.
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defendant knew the alien was an illegal entrant; (4) the defendant
knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the alien's last en-
try into the United States was within the last three years; and (5)
the defendant acted willfully in furtherance of the alien's violation
of the law.6 2
1. Lack of Knowledge Defense
Merkt's primary defense centered around the knowledge ele-
ment of section 1324(a)(2). Merkt did not know that the aliens
were in violation of the law. Merkt sought to introduce a subjective
test of intent in an attempt to exempt her actions from the pur-
view of the statute. Specifically, she introduced evidence that she
believed the aliens were political refugees entitled to legal status in
the United States under the provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980.
Merkt asserted that because of her belief, she did not act with the
requisite intent. The Court rejected this argument, noting that a
defendant's subjective belief based on a mistake of law concerning
refugee status could not be used as a defense."e
The court glossed over the real issue in this cursory conclu-
sion: Merkt's defense attempted to go beyond a simple "ignorance
of the law" defense. She sought to introduce one of the major
objectives of the sanctuary movement, namely that the govern-
ment, by failing to recognize the Salvadorans as refugees, is actu-
ally violating its own laws."
It appears that the Salvadorans do indeed qualify for refugee
status under the Refugee Act of 1980. Under present immigration
laws, in order to qualify for political asylum, a political or social
group must show a well-founded fear of persecution."5 While the
granting of asylum is discretionary, pursuant to section 208 of the
Act,6 6 upon a showing of clear probability of persecution, relief
62. See id.
63. 764 F.2d at 273.
64. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
65. In INS v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489 (1984), the Supreme Court decided the contours of
the well-founded fear standard. The Court concluded that the standard is more generous
than the "clear probability of persecution" standard (more likely than not that the alien
would be subject to persecution). It is arguable, however, that the Supreme Court really did
not decide the precise meaning of the well-founded fear standard under section
1101(a)(42)(A) in Stevic because the Court there was concerned with section 1253(h), the
deportation provision.
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
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from deportation is mandatory. 7 Thus, it is possible for an alien to
qualify for refugee status by fulfilling the requirements of section
208. Under either procedure, the Salvadoran aliens qualify for ref-
ugee status. Once these facts are recognized, Merkt's defense is
more persuasive.
The Fifth Circuit confronted the knowledge element of section
1324(a)(2) in United States v. Pereira-Pineda68 In Pereira, the
defendant argued that the Salvadoran aliens he transported were
automatically entitled to seek asylum. Therefore, the aliens had a
right to remain in the United States until they applied for asy-
lum. 9 The argument was based on the premise that once the aliens
are eligible for asylum, they are no longer unlawfully in the United
States. Thus, the government could not prove one element of a
section 1324(a)(2) violation.7 0
The court rejected the argument that every Salvadoran has an
absolute right to "reside" within the United States from the mo-
ment he arrives. The court emphasized the fact that Pereira was
fully aware that the aliens had not been lawfully admitted to this
country and did not possess proper entry documents." Another
factor influential in the court's decision to affirm Pereira's convic-
tion was that the illegal transportation was not intended to facili-
tate attempts by the aliens to file applications for asylum.
2. Lack of Intent Defense
Merkt introduced a second defense based on the last factor in
the court's decision in Pereira. She argued that she never intended
to further the aliens' illegal presence in the United States." Merkt
asserted that she sought to assist the aliens in reaching the INS
office to apply for asylum and thus, she was intending to comply,
and not violate immigration law.
The Fifth Circuit had never directly addressed the require-
ment that the act must be conducted "in furtherance of the aliens'
violation of the law" until Merkt. 3 The court cited with approval
67. Id.
68. 721 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983).
69. Id. at 139.
70. Id. at 138.
71. Id.
72. Merkt, 764 F.2d at 271.
73. Id.
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the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Moreno4 which held
that in order for the government to show that the defendant had
transported aliens in furtherance of the aliens' violation of the law,
it must show a "direct and substantial relationship between that
transportation and the furtherance of the alien's presence in the
United States." 5 In other words, the defendant's act of transporta-
tion must be significant in furthering the alien's illegal presence. 6
The Fifth Circuit accepted the Ninth Circuit's rationale, holding
that a person intending to assist an alien in obtaining legal status
is not acting "in furtherance of" the alien's illegal presence in this
country.7
Merkt objected to the district court's instruction to the jury
concerning her intent in transporting the aliens to San Antonio.
The prosecution sought to demonstrate that Merkt's intent was
not to assist the aliens in obtaining legal status because she did not
proceed to the nearest INS office in Harlingen, Texas.' To rebut
this inference, Merkt placed two expert witnesses on the stand who
testified about the discrepancy of treatment of aliens by INS offi-
cials in San Antonio and Harlingen, and that the San Antonio of-
fice is known as the more favorable location.7 The district court,
however, instructed the jury that if Merkt intended to take the
aliens to an INS office other than the nearest one, the jury was to
find Merkt acted with intent to violate the statute.
The Fifth Circuit struck down the district court's jury instruc-
tion. The court claimed that this instruction had no basis in law
and held that intent is not demonstrated by transporting an alien
to an immigration office which happens to be further away than
the geographically closest office.80 The Fifth Circuit reversed
Merkt's conviction on all three counts and remanded the case to
the district court for a new trial.8 '
74. 561 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1977).
75. Id. at 1323.
76. Merkt, 764 F.2d at 271-72.
77. Id. at 272.
78. Id.
79. The testimony indicated that at the Harlingen office the chances of a successful
application for asylum were negligible. In fact, aliens would be immediately arrested and
bond set at an exorbitant amount. In contrast, at the San Antonio office aliens would be
documented, scheduled for an interview, and released. (An order to show cause for a depor-
tation hearing will be issued only if asylum was denied.) Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 275.
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B. United States v. Elder82
Merkt never claimed a first amendment right to afford sanctu-
ary to the persecuted Salvadorans. As a result, the decision never
addressed this controversial claim. The District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, however, was forced to confront this
issue in the context of the sanctuary prosecution of John Elder.
John Elder was the director of Casa Romero, the same refugee
haven where Stacey Merkt volunteered her services. On March 12,
1984, Elder transported three illegal Salvadorans from Casa Ro-
mero to a nearby bus station. Border Patrol agents observed the
Salvadorans exiting Elder's vehicle and charged Elder with viola-
tion of section 1324(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Elder moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis of freedom of
religion and domestic and international refugee law.
The district court refused to dismiss the indictment against
Elder based on first amendment grounds, as well as domestic or
international law. Elder was tried and acquitted on January 24,
1985 of the charges that he unlawfully transported illegal aliens.8 3
1. Domestic Law Defense
Elder argued that under domestic law, particularly section
1253(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 4 he could not be
rightfully charged with violation of section 1324(a)(2) because the
aliens he transported qualified for refugee status, and, therefore,
could not be considered illegal aliens.85 This argument is similar to
Merkt's lack of knowledge defense. However, Elder attempted to
go beyond the requirement of subjective knowledge by forcefully
asserting that the aliens deserved refugee status under United
States immigration laws. Elder argued that his actions were legal
since the Salvadorans he transported qualified for protection as
refugees, despite the lack of formal refugee status. The court repu-
diated this argument, noting that neither the court nor Elder are
82. 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
83. Id. at 1576.
84. The Attorney General "shall not deport or return any alien.., to a country if the
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
85. Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1580.
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authorized by statute8" to determine refugee status. The court re-
fused to circumvent the statutory scheme and thus deferred action
to the legislature.
2. International Law Defense
Elder also argued that his actions complied with the mandates
of international law which Congress adopted in the Refugee Act of
1980.87 The court refused to dismiss Elder's indictment on that ba-
sis, saying that it could not "interfere with political decisions
which the United States as a sovereign nation chooses to make in
the interpretation, enforcement, or rejection of treaty commit-
ments which affect immigration."88 The court simply concluded
that Congress intended the Refugee Act of 1980 to fulfill its inter-
national obligations without determining the United States' obliga-
tions under international law concerning human rights.
The sanctuarians are faced with a dilemma. They hope to
force the courts to evaluate their claim that the government's ac-
tions in deporting refugees to violent countries violates interna-
tional law and that the government's actions in prosecuting those
who offer sanctuary violates the religious freedom of those prose-
cuted. However, the courts do not accept that the sanctuarians
have standing to assert these claims. If the sanctuarians have no
standing to contest these issues, then no one has standing.89
86. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1253(h) (1982).
87. Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1576.
88. Id. at 1581. Other U.S. citizens have tried to uphold international law and have
faced problems similar to those which the sanctuarians faced. See, e.g., United States v.
Allen, 760 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1985)(anti-nuclear protestors).
89. Arguably, the violation of first amendment rights may, in itself confer standing to
U.S. citizens to challenge governmental action. In Valley Forge College v. Americans United,
545 U.S. 464 (1982), a group of separatist taxpayers challenged the transfer of government
property to a sectarian college. They claimed standing as taxpayers and as religions separat-
ists. The Supreme Court evaluated their standing as taxpayers under the test developed in
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). To have standing under Flast, a taxpayer must contest
the constitutionality of acts of Congress pursuant to the taxing and spending clause. The
separatists did not qualify under this test because the transfer of property was made by an
agency, not by Congress. The sanctuarians also would fail this test as the acts which they
object to are agency acts, not acts which fall under the Congressional spending and taxing
powers.
The Valley Forge separatists also claimed standing under the establishment clause. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals had held that, as citizens, they had suffered in one way "to
their shared individuated right to a government that 'shall make no law respecting the es-
tablishment of religion.' " Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. v.
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 261 (3d Cir.
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3. Freedom of Religion Defense
Elder's strongest defense was based on the contention that his
first amendment right to the free exercise of his religion entitles
him to practice his religious beliefs, which require that he provide
shelter and assistance to Salvadorans. He claimed that the enforce-
ment of a criminal law, section 1324(a)(2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, unconstitutionally interfered with his religious
practices.90 When a U.S. citizen asserts that his actions are pro-
tected under a freedom of religion claim, the claimant bears the
initial burden of demonstrating that his religious beliefs motivate
his protected conduct.9 The burden then shifts to the government
1980). The Supreme Court disagreed. While noting that an injury need not be economic, the
court refused to accept a mere disagreement with the conduct of government as sufficient to
confer standing to sue on the separatists.
Justice Brennan, dissenting, reasoned that the Framers of the Constitution intended
that the establishment clause be enforced. How is it to be enforced if citizens do not have
standing to contest government actions which violate it? The taxpayer, the citizen, was the
beneficiary whom the framers had in mind when they wrote the establishment clause. It is
the taxpayer, citizen and beneficiary, who suffers when the clause is violated.
90. The first amendment mandates that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." The second clause, the
free exercise clause, is the portion of the amendment under which Elder sought protection.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
More directly, "The First Amendment embraces two concepts- freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be."
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
91. This type of analysis is commonly referred to as a "two prong balancing test." It
was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961),
wherein the Court considered the constitutionality of Sunday closing laws as applied to Or-
thodox Jews.
Subsequently, the Court has examined the right of U.S. citizens to act in accord with
sincerely held religious beliefs when the exercise of their religion conflicted with a Wisconsin
criminal statute. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The statute made school attend-
ance compulsory until the age of sixteen. Members of the Old Order Amish religion, kept
their fourteen and fifteen year old children at home. They believed that they would endan-
ger their own salvation and that of their children if they 3ent the children to school. The
Court, finding that the Amish way of life and the Amish religious faith were inseparable,
held that Yoder and Miller's religiously motivated acts were protected by the first
amendment.
In determining whether a religiously motivated act is constitutionally protected, the
court may also ask whether the act is an integral part of the religious ritual or merely relig-
iously sanctioned way of seeking salvation. In Leary v. INS, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967),
where a member of the Bramakrishna sect of the Hindu religion admitted that the use of
marijuana was only one of many ways to attain salvation, the Fifth Circuit held that his use
of the drug was not constitutionally protected. In Peyote Way Church of God v. Smith, 142
F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1984), however, where the ingestion of peyote was a sacrament, the Fifth
Circuit held that peyote ingestion by church members during carefully controlled religious
rituals was constitutionally protected.
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to justify placing limitations on the religious conduct by demon-
strating a compelling governmental interest in imposing the limita-
tion.2 Moreover, the limitation on religion must be the least bur-
densome way to accomplish the government's purpose. "
The court first determined that Elder met the initial burden
of demonstrating that his beliefs motivated his conduct: several
clergymen testified that assisting those in need is a fundamental
aspect of Christianity and that providing such assistance is an ap-
propriate expression of the Christian gospel." Elder demonstrated
the necessity for his assistance by presenting evidence of the tur-
bulent conditions in El Salvador.15 The court indicated that this
evidence was unnecessary because it did not have to make foreign
policy judgments in order to determine that Elder acted in accor-
dance with his religious beliefs. The court emphasized that it was
not acting as the arbiter of canon law nor interpreting the Chris-
tian doctrine.
The government then offered proof of a compelling govern-
mental interest which would justify governmental interference with
religion. The court found that immigration control is conducted
primarily for security reasons. Thus, the court concluded that
there is an overriding governmental interest in maintaining the in-
tegrity of the nation's borders through the enforcement of its im-
migration and naturalization policy which justifies enforcement of
section 1324(a)(2) against Elder.9
The court next analyzed whether the government is utilizing
the least restrictive means of accomplishing its goal in securing the
nation's borders. Congress, by establishing procedures to regulate
entry into the United States, has recognized that this country can-
not accommodate all aliens who desire United States residency.
The court reasoned that the government, as the sole authority for
92. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. at 613-14 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
93. Id. at 607.
94. Bishop John Fitzpatrick of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brownsville testified at
Elder's motion hearing as did Donovan Cook of the American Baptist Church, James An-
drews of the Presbyterian Church, John Steinbrook of the Lutheran Church, and Gilbert
Dawes and John Sopher of the United Methodist Church. They all agreed that "meeting
material human needs represents an essential aspect of Christianity, and that each individ-
ual remains free to fulfill this obligation according to the dictates of his or her own con-
science." Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1577.
95. Elder presented testimony of "torture, murder, brutalities, and disappearances" of
church workers, civilians, and government officials. Id. at 1578.
96. Id. at 1577-78.
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regulation of immigration, cannot accommodate Elder's religious
beliefs in its immigration policy."7 The court concluded that the
government was utilizing the least restrictive means of accomplish-
ing its goal because Elder was still free to exercise Christihn char-
ity to those aliens who apply for asylum and proceed under INS
rules.98 The setting in which the freedom of religion defense was
presented made it particularly significant.9 A freedom of religion
defense has strong ramifications in the criminal context where the
claimant faces the imposition of a fine or imprisonment. The possi-
bility of these consequences makes the defendant's religious inter-
est weightier than it would be in a civil case and, more impor-
tantly, places the defendant's interest on par governmental
concerns.
1 00
The importance of the defendant's religious interest deserves
even more weight when the government's interest is closely ex-
amined. The government's interest can be analyzed as consisting of
two distinct components: first is the concern of the government in
stopping the smuggling of illegal aliens; second is the government's
concern with impeding the harboring and concealing of aliens al-
ready in the country.0 1 While the government's interest in main-
taining a regulated system of entry is quite strong, it cannot apply
to those already within the country. In this respect, the govern-
ment's interest loses its potency and the freedom of religion de-
fense gains power and persuasiveness.
The Supreme Court was confronted with a variation of this
issue in the conscientious objector cases.102 The interests of those
who objected to the draft is similar to the interests asserted by
Elder and the others. Both situations involve the government's in-
terest in controlling the integrity of its borders. In the first situa-
tion, however, the conscientious objectors refused to participate in
war because of their religious convictions. In the latter case, the
sanctuary workers desire the right to assist aliens as an affirmative
97. Id. at 1580.
98. In concluding that individual circumvention of the immigration procedure thwarts
the legitimate goals of immigration control, the Court noted: "Elder's do-it-yourself immi-
gration policy, while charitable, gives away what is not his to give away the Government's
legitimate right to examine every person who enters the country so that the Government
can make informed decisions on who will be admitted." Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1578.
99. See NAT'L. L.J., Feb. 25, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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exercise of religious practice. In the conscientious objector cases,
the Court deferred to the government's interest in defense and re-
fused to recognize a first amendment right to avoid military service
in the absence of a statutory exemption.
Similarly, the Court recently faced this conflict between a re-
ligiously motivated act and a military regulation.103 An Air Force
psychologist and ordained rabbi wore his yarmulke when testifying
as a defense witness at a court-martial. Opposing counsel com-
plained that the wearing of a yarmulke violated Air Force regula-
tions. Captain Goldman refused to comply with an order that he
not wear the yarmulke outside the hospital when he was on duty.
His request for permission to appear for duty in civilian clothing
was denied, and a negative recommendation was given in connec-
tion with his application to extend his term of active service. Cap-
tain Goldman sued the Secretary of Defense and others, claiming
that his right to freely exercise his religion had been violated.
The Court deferred to the military, stating, "to accomplish its
mission, the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, com-
mitment, and esprit de corps." 104 The plurality conceded that an
absolute bar to the wearing of a yarmulke might make military life
objectionable to some people, but held that "IT]he First Amend-
ment does not require the military to accommodate such practices
in the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity
sought by the dress regulations.''105
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, noted that the bar to the
wearing of a yarmulke by military personnel did not make military
service merely objectionable, it made it impossible for an observant
Orthodox Jew to serve in the military. 08 He also objected to the
Court's analysis saying, "Today the Court eschews its constitution-
ally mandated role. It adopts for review of military decisions af-
fecting First Amendment rights a subrational-basis stan-
dard-absolute, uncritical 'deference to the professional judgment
of military authorities.' "107
103. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
104. Id. at 1313.
105. Id. at 1314.
106. Id. at 1317 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court's current posture of deferral to administrative authorities can be
seen in a series of recent cases. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984)(U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit was reversed and a ruling of the
Environmental Protection Agency upheld); Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985)(Eleventh
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Absent congressional authorization for a religious exemption,
the courts are hesitant to impute a first amendment right. Based
on the foregoing, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court, if faced
with the sanctuary issue, will declare that the right to engage in
one's religious practice overrides conflicting immigration laws.
IV. BEYOND MERKT AND ELDER
The decision in Elder remains noteworthy despite Elder's
aquittal. First, it is the only published opinion discussing sanctu-
ary prosecutions in relation to first amendment and international
law issues. Although Merkt is the highest pronouncement by a
United States Court of Appeals regarding sanctuary, the decision
lacks mention of these important issues raised in Elder.
Second, the decision is influential for future sanctuary prose-
cutions. Although Elder was acquitted, the decision sets a prece-
dent for the validity of freedom of a religion defense in a sanctuary
prosecution case. Although the court rejected the freedom of reli-
gion defense, other defendants charged under section 1324(a)(2)
may wish to raise other first amendment defenses.'
A. INS Asylum Processing of Salvadorans
Sanctuarians differ with the Elder court precisely on the point
of efficacy of sections 1158(a) and 1253(h) because they are cur-
rently applied to otherwise deportable Salvadorans. Very few
Circuit was reversed and a ruling by the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986)(discussed in the text); and INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S.
444 (1985)(Eighth Circuit decision was reversed and the refusal of the Board of Immigration
Appeals to reopen deportation hearings upheld).
It is not surprising therefore, that the Board of Immigration Appeals has refused to
apply on remand the standards set by the Ninth Circuit in asylum cases. See, e.g., Cardoza-
Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985). The court articulated the standard as: If
Congress has not "directly spoken to the precise question at issue," but there is an adminis-
trative interpretation of the statute in question; the administrative interpretation is control-
ling law so long as it "is based on a permissible construction of the statute." 467 U.S. at 843.
108. For instance, a freedom of association claim may be asserted by a defendant
charged under section 1324(a)(2). The test applied in such a context is (1) that the govern-
mental interest is a compelling one, and (2) that the interest is the least restrictive means of
protecting that interest. This is generally recognized as the strict scrutiny test. See NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) ("State action which may have the effect of cur-
tailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."). It is unlikely that this
defense would succeed. Although the test utilized in the freedom of association is essentially
the same test as used in the freedom of religion context, the defense may be equally unavail-
ing in sanctuary prosecutions.
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Salvadorans have been granted asylum in the United States. The
United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees Mission to Moni-
tor I.N.S. Asylum Processing of Salvadoran Illegal Entrants found
that only one applicant out of two thousand Salvadorans who ap-
plied was granted asylum in 1981.09 This dismal record prompted
the sanctuarians to shelter the Salvadorans.
Although decisions to exclude certain aliens are difficult, they
are necessary because "the United States cannot absorb all who
wish to enter this country to take advantage of its relative tran-
quility and bounty."" o Congress has been charged with making
these decisions, through sections 1158(a) and 1253(h) of the Refu-
gee Act, and has provided for those who flee repressive countries,
such as El Salvador because of persecution. The Elder court found
"that the implementation of the immigration laws represents an
important Government interest which, on balance, justifies en-
forcement of Section 1324(a)(2) against Elder.""'
The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have reviewed sections
1158(a) and 1253(h) of the Refugee Act and determined that the
position of the two sections requiring equivalent levels of proof by
an alien asylum applicant is manifestly contrary to the statute.
Section 1158(a), drafted to comply with the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees (the Protocol),'" requires that "(1) the
alien have a subjective fear, and (2) that this fear have enough of a
basis that it can be considered well-founded." ' 3 The requirements
under section 1253(h) are stricter because the Attorney General
has no discretion under the language of the statute." 4 The Ninth
Circuit found it could not defer to the administrative interpreta-
tion given to section 1158(a) because "[iut is apparent from the
very words of the statute that the burden under the asylum section
(section 208(a)) is not identical to the prohibition-against-deporta-
tion section (section 243(h)) burden.""'
The interpretation given to section 1253(h) by the INS was
109. See Comment, supra note 1.
110. Elder, 601 F.Supp. at 1579.
111. Id. at 1580.
112. United Nations Convention Relating to The Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force for the United
States Nov. 1, 1968).
113. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1985).
114. Id. at 1451-52.
115. Id. at 1452.
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upheld by the Supreme Court in INS v. Stevic"' in 1984. Prior to
Stevic, an alien who applied for asylum was required to present
prima facie evidence which showed a "clear probability of persecu-
tion" if he was returned to his homeland." 7 This is an objective
standard, under which the alien must present the court with evi-
dence which is sufficient to demonstrate that there is a greater-
than-fifty percent chance that his life or freedom would be
threatened if he were deported to his homeland.'
8
The "well-founded fear" standard of section 1158(a) is a sub-
jective standard which looks at whether it is reasonable for the in-
dividual to fear persecution; some courts have said that this is a
more generous standard than the clear probability of persecution
standard.' Other courts, however, have interpreted the well-
founded fear standard as simply a new version of the old "clear
probability of persecution" standard. The Seventh Circuit rea-
soned that this standard requires more than the alien's subjective
state of mind."' The court held that the alien must show by objec-
tive evidence either that "he actually has been a victim of persecu-
tion or that his fear is more than a matter of his own
conjecture." ''
Finally, the Supreme Court determined the standard to be ap-
plied in section 1253(h) cases in INS v. Stevic.2 21 Predreg Stevic,
upon receipt of notice to surrender for deportation in 1981, filed a
motion to reopen the deportation proceedings. He claimed that the
standard under the new act was a subjective standard and that he
should be allowed to stay in the United States because he genu-
inely feared that he would be imprisoned if he returned to Jugos-
lavia.'23 The Court held that the act changed the standard to be
applied in evaluating Stevic's claim for asylum, stating that, "an
alien must establish a clear probability of persecution to avoid
prosecution under Section 243(h)."' 24
The Supreme Court has not discussed the standard to be ap-
116. 104 S. Ct. 2489 (1984).
117. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1320 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984).
118. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d. at 1452.
119. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1985); Argueta v. INS, 759
F.2d 1395, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1321.
120. Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977).
121. Id.
122. INS v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489, 2501 (1984).
123. Id. at 2491.
124. Id. at 2501.
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plied when an alien applies for asylum under section 1158(a). The
Ninth Circuit, however, has set forth a standard in Argueta v.
INS' 2 5 and Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS.'12 In these cases, the court
set out a clear and logical procedure to be followed in evaluating
those asylum petitions which are presented during deportation
proceedings.1
7
Both cases dealt with Salvadorans who had fled to the United
States in fear of El Salvadoran death squads. Bolanos was
threatened because he refused to infiltrate the government on the
behalf of the guerrillas.'2 8 Argueta was threatened because he was
suspected of being a member of the Guerilla organization FPL.'2 9
Both men wanted to remain neutral; both entered the United
States illegally and requested asylum at their deportation hearings,
claiming that they would be subject to persecution if returned to
El Salvador. Their applications were denied by INS judges and the
BIA.,S0
An alien's request for asylum during deportation proceedings
must be evaluated first under section 1253(h) and then, if he fails
to meet the 1253(h) standard, under section 1158(a) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act."' Under section 1253(h), the Attor-
ney General is forbidden to deport any alien who can establish a
clear probability that he would be persecuted if returned to his
home. The court of appeals applied the substantial evidence test in
reviewing the factual finding that Bolanos had not proven that
there was a clear probability that his life would be in danger if he
were returned to El Salvador. s"2 Section 1158(a), alternatively, al-
125. 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
126. 749 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1985).
127. Bolanos-Hernandez and Argueta were not the only post-Stevic cases which dealt
with the standard for the application of Section 1158(a) of the Refugee Act, granting to the
Attorney General the discretion to grant asylum, and the standard for the application of
section 1253(h), prohibiting the Attorney General from deporting an alien to a country
where his life or freedom would be threatened. The Sixth Circuit in Youkhanna v. INS, 749
F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1984), and the Seventh Circuit in Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562
(7th Cir. 1984), agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the standards under 1158(a) and 1253(h)
are not the same. However, not all circuits which have dealt with this issue agree. The Third
Circuit, in Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984); Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.
1982); and Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1985), held that the standards under the
two sections are identical.
128. Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1318.
129. Argueta, 759 F.2d at 1395.
130. See Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1319; Argueta, 759 F.2d at 1396.
131. Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1319.
132. Id. at 1326.
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lows the Attorney General to grant asylum on a discretionary basis
if the alien demonstrates a well-founded fear of persecution. Be-
cause the decision is a discretionary one the Bolanos court held
that the correct standard of review is abuse of discretion.
3 1
The court first reviewed Bolanos' request for asylum under
section 1253(h). The government had denied asylum, claiming that
Bolanos had not proven either that his life or freedom would be
threatened if he were deported or that such threat would result
from his political beliefs. 34 In support of his claim that his life
would be in danger if he were deported, Bolanos testified about his
ordeal with the death squads.13 5 The INS judge did not question
that the threat was genuine. Instead, the court found that Bolanos
had not sufficiently demonstrated a threat to his life because his
only independent corroborating evidence consisted of newspaper
articles which described "the violent retribution that may follow
the expression of political views in El Salvador and the executions
conducted in retaliation for refusals to join political guerilla
groups.""' The INS judge and the BIA found this evidence, cou-
pled with Bolanos' testimony, insufficient. They wanted Bolanos to
provide affidavits corroborating his story. The BIA concluded that
"the specific threat against Bolanos' life was merely 'representative
of the general conditions in El Salvador.'""
The court of appeals held that, while proof of a general level
of violence is not enough to satisfy the standard, a specific threat
was more believable when made in a country where violence is
prevalent.' Further, the requirement that a person whose life had
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1322.
135. Bolanos testified that a guerilla group had approached him and asked him to infil-
trate the government. They felt that it would be possible for him to do this because he was a
former member of the army, the Partido Nacional de Reconciliation and the voluntary po-
lice squad. The guerrillas threatened him with death if he failed to comply with their de-
mands. These same guerrillas had killed five of his friends and had forced his brother to join
them. Bolanos did not wish to join them, nor did he wish to ally himself with the govern-
ment against them; he wanted to remain neutral. Eight days after the threat he fled to the
U.S. Id. at 1318.
136. Id. at 1318-19.
137. Id. at 1323.
138. For example, the type of proof which the Fifth Circuit considers sufficient to
demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution" is discussed in Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d
129 (5th Cir. 1978). Fleurinor, a Haitian citizen, who had been living in the Bahamas from
1963 to 1968, returned to Haiti for a visit. While in Haiti, he was arrested, accused of taking
part in an abortive invasion of the island, and imprisoned. He managed to bribe his way to
freedom and fled Haiti. Id. at 132. At the deportation proceeding, he testified that he feared
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been threatened provide independent corroborative evidence of the
threat was unreasonable. Indeed, the court said, "Persecutors are
hardly likely to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to
their acts of persecution. '"I 9
After holding that Bolanos' evidence was sufficient to demon-
strate that it was more-likely-than-not that Bolanos' life would be
threatened if he were deported to El Salvador, the court held that
the threat arose as a result of Bolanos' political opinion. The BIA
refused to recognize the decision to remain neutral as a political
decision. The court said that the Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted
"to provide protection to all victims of persecution regardless of
ideology."4 0 People holding moderate opinions should be accorded
the same protection as those whose opinions are more extreme.
Further, a person's reasons for his political decision are irrelevant
to the inquiry. The political decision, once taken, motivates the
threat and therefore is sufficient for section 1253(h) and 1158(a)
purposes.
After deciding that Bolanos had satisfied section 1253(h), the
court briefly discussed asylum under section 1158(a). The court
noted that, because 1158(a)'s well-founded fear standard is more
generous than 1253(h)'s clear probability of persecution standard,
the alien who could satisfy the requirements of 1253(h) concur-
for his life if he were forced to return to Haiti. The INS judge ruled that these facts were
more indicative of extortion than of political persecution, noting Fleurinor's ability to
purchase his return to the Bahamas with a new Haitian passport. Id. at 132-34.
On appeal, Fleurinor presented as evidence a report by Amnesty International which
described political conditions in Haiti, in an effort to vacate the decision of the BIA. The
court refused to consider the report, stating that under 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c), Fleurinor was
required to satisfy both prongs of a two-pronged test by showing that the report was "mate-
rial" and that there were reasonable grounds for his failure to produce it at the prior pro-
ceedings. Fleurinor, 585 F.2d at 133.
On the issue of the materiality of the report, the court held that, "[In order for evi-
dence to be 'material' within the meaning of Section 2347(c), the evidence must be proba-
tive on the issue of this alien being subject to persecution, in the event of deportation." Id.
The court found that Fleurinor had not satisfied the first prong of the test because he had
failed to show that he would be subject to persecution, and agreed with the INS judge that,
"[T]o prove probable persecution today, Fleurinor would have to produce some evidence
that the Haitian government remembers him." Id. at 134.
Fleurinor also failed to satisfy the second prong of the test because he was unable to
show reasonable grounds for not producing the report during the prior proceedings. It was
shown that his counsel had been in receipt of the report a full year before the BIA affirmed
the decision of the INS judge. Id. at 133.
139. Id. at 134.
140. Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1325.
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rently satisfied section 1158(a).14' Bolanos could not be deported
because 1253(h) mandated that he be granted asylum.
The confusion over the proper standards climaxed when the
BIA refused to apply the standards set by the Ninth Circuit. In
Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS,14 2 the BIA applied the "clear probability
of persecution" standard in evaluating the asylum petitions of two
Nicaraguan women. The court responded rhetorically saying "The
Board appears to feel that it is exempt from the holding in Mar-
bury v. Madison ..... ,,143 The court reversed and remanded, in-
structing the board to "evaluate those claims under the proper le-
gal standard. ' 1
44
On February 24, 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Cardoza-Fonseca.148 Whether the Supreme Court will re-
quire deferral to decisions of the BIA or adopt the Ninth Circuit's
analysis of section 1158(a) remains to be seen.
B. Sanctuary Plea in American Jurisprudence
The sanctuarians, who have acted in response to the frequent
denial of asylum petitions by the INS, have presented the courts
with a concept which is new to American jurisprudence-the idea
that a religious group can offer protection to those who, although
they are not criminals, would be harmed by their own govern-
ments, or by the opposition to their governments, or both if they
were returned to their native lands. Although the idea is new in
the United States, it was formerly a part of British jurisprudence.
How should the U.S. courts respond to the challenge posed by
the sanctuarians? Roger Dworkin suggests that the judge in a hard
case is forced to weigh policy considerations and moral princi-
ples.' 4 6 The policy considerations are those which "justify a politi-
cal decision by showing that the decision advances or protects
some collective goal of the community."' 47 The moral principles in-
clude those which "justify a political decision by showing that the
decision respects or secures some individual or group right." 148 The
141. Id. at 1326.
142. 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
143. Id. at 1454.
144. Id. at 1455.
145. 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986).
146. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82 (1977).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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policy considerations in the asylum cases are the need to protect
U.S. citizens from the entrance of terrorists, the inability of the
United States to absorb the vast numbers of persons who are flee-
ing their homelands because of the threat of violence, and the de-
sire to avoid embarrassing our allies by accepting as refugees their
citizens who claim that their lives are threatened by government
terrorism. ' 49 The principles involved include freedom of religion
and conscience and the responsibility of both individuals and the
state for the protection of innocent human life.'50
The judge who is faced by such weighty decisions turns to the
constitution. The constitution, however, says nothing about sanc-
tuary.'5 ' In fact, the precise limits of religious freedom are not con-
tained in the constitution. There are only standards: guides to be
followed by the courts.
Anti-slavery judges faced a similar situation in pre-civil war
America. 152 Although slavery was legal in the South, it was illegal
in the North. Various issues arose for which there were no provi-
sions in the constitution. Should slavery be legal in the territories?
Should slaves become freemen when their owners moved to free
states? Were the courts, police, and citizens of the free states re-
quired to assist in the capture and return of fugitive slaves when
such assistance violated their religious principles, their moral be-
liefs, and their state constitutions?
The anti-slavery forces split three ways. 53 One group inter-
preted the constitution so that it did not support such immoral
actions. 64 Another believed that the constitution did support pro-
slavery actions and therefore should be amended. 5 5 The third
group denounced the "immoral" constitution, believing that, to be
justified, the North must secede from the Union."5 "
Through crisis after crisis, Congress preserved the Union by
passing compromise legislation. The Supreme Court interpreted
these statutes in a way which favored slavery. Tremendous pres-
149. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574.
150. Id.
151. See generally F. MAITLAND & F. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
(1915) (brief history of the sanctuary doctrine).
152. R.M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
153. W. WIECEK. THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-
1848 (1977).
154. Id. at 202-27.
155. Id. at 249-75.
156. Id. at 228-48.
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sure was brought to bear on the anti-slavery judge. Some citizens
pressured the judiciary to interpret the constitution as an anti-
slavery document, but that became gradually more difficult as the
body of controlling law grew more favorable to the interests of the
slave states.1"7 Many abolitionists declared that the only moral
thing to do was to refuse to apply the constitution at all. A God-
fearing man, they said, could not be a judge. 158
At the heart of the debate lay the distinction between natural
and positive law. Slavery obviously violated natural law,"16 and
therefore could only be maintained if created by a positive law. 6'
The positive law was comprised of the laws of the Southern states
and several provisions of the U.S. Constitution. But, whenever spe-
cific positive law did not apply to the situation, a judge was free to
look back to the source of law-natural law-and decide the issue
in a way which favored the anti-slavery interests.
Today, some jurists interpret the constitution according to a
theory of strict construction.' 6' If a specific question arises, they
try to interpret what the framers meant. However, this theory
"makes strict interpretation of the text yield a narrow view of con-
stitutional rights, because it limits such rights to those recognized
by a limited group of people at a fixed date of history."'6 2
The plea of sanctuary, unlike slavery, was not a part of En-
glish common law when that body of law was adopted by the
United States, and therefore could not have been included in the
framers' intentions when the first amendment was added to the
constitution. Thus, there is no positive law of sanctuary. The fram-
ers would have had to resort to natural law had they been con-
fronted with a sanctuary case. Perhaps they did: the framers did
not turn away refugees.
The alternative view, that the provisions of the constitution
are moral concepts, allows the judge to evaluate the new situation
in the light of constitutional norms. 63 The judge who adheres to
this view is an activist judge. He would evaluate the sanctuary plea
157. R.M. COVER, supra note 152; W. WIECEK, supra note 153.
158. R.M. COVER, supra note 152.
159. Somersets Case cited in R.M. COVER, supra note 152, at 1760-1848.
160. Id.
161. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 146, at 131-37.
162. Id. at 134.
163. Id. at 137-40.
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in the light of congressional and executive acts,14 and in the light
of contemporary moral thought. If the court found that the various
elements of U.S. society agreed that sanctuary should be provided,
that it was immoral to refuse asylum to refugees from El Salvador,
an activist judge could allow the use of the sanctuary plea although
it had never before been a part of American jurisprudence. The
court would make new law according to the moral standards laid
down by the framers in the constitution.
There is no consensus. The sanctuary issue is so new that
many Americans are not aware of its origin or development. Thus,
the courts cannot come to a valid decision about it. Nor can the
courts defer to the political decisions of the executive branch with-
out forcing Congress to decide on the constitutionality of the appli-
cation of its own statute against the harboring of illegal aliens to
those who shelter refugees that would violate the separation of
164. See, e.g., The accession to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force for the United
States, Nov. 1, 1968).
Under the Protocol, the United States must comply with article 33.1 of the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees which states:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group or political opinion.
Id. art. 33.1.
Section 1253(h) drafted to comply with this language, states:
(1) The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an
alien described in section 1251(a)(19) of this title) to a country if the Attorney
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular so-
cial group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
When the United States acceded to the Protocol, in 1968, it appeared to substitute a new,
subjective standard for the old, objective one. The protocol, and section 1101(a)(42)(A) of
the Refugee Act, define refugees as persons who,
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (emphasis added).
Pub. L. No. § 208(a)(42)(A).
The Refugee Act of 1980, which was enacted to conform with the requirements of the stat-
ute, provides that the Attorney General shall,
establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a
land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asy-
lum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the
meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
powers.
What then should the U.S. courts do in this situation? Should
they do nothing? It is unlikely that inaction would result in an
even greater influx of refugees than that which the United States is
now experiencing. The cost to the sanctuarians of sheltering refu-
gees, in terms of time and money, is significant. Further, changes
in governments and in political conditions in many countries may
result in the voluntary return of many refugees to their homes. In-
deed, if the United States and its allies work to stop terrorism
throughout the world, the numbers of persons fleeing for their lives
might diminish, reducing the need for the evaluation of asylum
petitions.
Finally, what is the individual citizen to do if the Supreme
Court upholds INS asylum proceedings, thereby sanctioning the
return of men, women, and children to violent and dangerous
countries? Should the citizen violate the law and offer sanctuary?
No law instructs individual citizens on the correct response to
governmental acts that arguably violate national, international, or
religious laws. It may be true that the acts of the INS in deporting
nearly all Salvadorans who request asylum in the United States
violates the U.N. Protocol to which the United States acceded in
1968. Sanctuarians cannot, however, claim protection under the in-
ternational law for their actions in harboring illegal aliens because
the treaty is directed at the acts of sovereign nations, not at the
acts of individual citizens. The protocol which forbids refoulment
does not instruct the citizen in what he is to do if his government,
a contracting state, returns persons whom the citizen believes will
be persecuted upon their return to their homeland.16
Nevertheless, sanctuarians can argue that they are simply liv-
ing according to the principals which the United States espoused
at the Nuremberg trials.16 6 The International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg found many people guilty of participating in the tor-
ture and murder of innocent human beings, although they had ac-
ted under the orders of their government. The Nuremberg court
found that these individuals had violated international law. A
number of those convicted were executed.
6 7
The sanctuarians have seen and heard evidence of torture and
165. See supra note 127.
166. C. COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1971).
167. Id.
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murder in Central America. They feel that their participation in
the deportation of those who have fled to the United States in
search of safety would violate international law. They have chosen
not to follow those orders which violate both their religious princi-
ples and international law.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Gillette v. United States,"8
said, "I had assumed that the welfare of the single human soul was
the ultimate test of the vitality of the First Amendment."' 8 In
Gillette, the Supreme Court held that a conscientious objector was
exempt from the draft only if he averred that his religion forbade
him to participate in any war. The objector who refused to fight in
only those wars which he felt were immoral was not relieved from
the obligation to serve. His exercise of discretion, said the court,
demonstrated that his refusal to submit to the draft was not a reli-
gious decision, but was a decision based on the individual's moral
code.
The statutory provision which exempted from the draft those
who objected to all wars on a religious basis specifically excluded
those who objected on a moral basis. Any other decision would re-
quire the court to go into the business of weighing an individual's
moral choices against the precepts of his religion which would
clearly violate the separation of church and state.170 A morally
good act can be described as one which enhances the survival of an
individual or of the human race.' The society which fails to rec-
ognize a category of persons and denies that category the protec-
tion of the laws which inure to survival has not advanced to the
point that a sufficient number of its members accept the moral
standard which mandates the protection of all persons.
"Though the law of some societies has occasionally been in ad-
vance of the accepted morality, normally law follows moral-
ity. .... ,,172 What, then, is a moral rule? H. Hart in discussing the
characteristics of moral rules has identified four qualities of moral
rules-internalized rules-which distinguish them from legal rules.
Moral rules are considered by many to be of primary impor-
tance.17 The person who believes in them will adhere to them de-
168. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
169. Id. at 469.
170. Gillette, 401 U.S. 437.
171. H. HART, THE CONCEPT or LAw 187 (1961).
172. Id. at 196.
173. Id. at 166.
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spite great personal sacrifice and will endeavor to teach them to
others. When a sanctuarian shelters a Salvadoran refugee, he does
so at the risk of criminal prosecution. The moral principle which
directs him to protect innocent life is, to him, of such overriding
importance that he is willing to risk a prison sentence in order to
follow it.
A moral rule is also immune from deliberate change.'7 4 The
rule that one should give shelter to a person whose life is endan-
gered has recurred throughout history. Indeed, the U.S. citizens
who decided to offer shelter to Salvadorans borrowed the term
"sanctuary" from Medieval England.
Hart's third characteristic of a moral rule is that an individual
is only morally responsible for his acts insofar as he can control
them. "' If a moral rule mandates the protection of refugees, and
an individual does not know that the refugees exist, he has no
moral culpability for his failure to offer shelter. The very publicity
engendered by the actions of the sanctuarians forces others to
make moral choices. The presence of a large number of aliens who
are being deported forces those aware of their plight to make simi-
lar choices. Perhaps this is one of the reasons that the newest de-
tention facility for such refugees is located far from any city, in the
swamps of Louisiana. 76
The final characteristic of a moral rule is the type of sanction
attached to its violation.'77 If a man breaks a law, he may be jailed.
If he believes that the law required him to act in an immoral fash-
ion, he may go to jail feeling like a hero, and he may be perceived
as a hero by society. But, if a person violates a moral rule, a rule
which he has internalized, he will undergo feelings of guilt and
shame. The sanctuarian may prefer going to jail to standing idle
while Salvadorans are deported. The actions of the government in
apprehending and convicting the sanctuarians are, therefore,
counterproductive.
The Gillette decision was also counterproductive. As Dworkin
indicates, "[tihe questions arises in each case whether the issues
are ripe for adjudication and whether adjudication would settle
these issues in a manner which would decrease the chance of or
174. Id. at 171.
175. Id. at 173.
176. Radio Broadcast, Morning Edition, National Public Radio (Aug. 6, 1986).
177. H. HART supra note 171, at 175.
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remove the grounds for further dissent.' ' 78 The Gillette decision
did not deter those who truly felt that the Vietnam War was im-
moral. Objectors were unmoved by the decision: they still felt that
the war and the draft were immoral. Moreover, they felt that they
were forced to act in a manner which the court had ruled was crim-
inal or to violate the dictates of their own consciences.
7 9
The controversy over the Vietnam War parallels the Salvado-
ran situation. No consensus had been reached about the war when
Gillette was decided. No consensus has been reached about the
plight of those who flee Central American violence in the 1980's.
V. CONCLUSION
The sanctuary movement, in its most basic sense, is a condem-
nation of the Reagan administration's foreign policy towards El
Salvador. In a different sense, the sanctuary movement opposes
the U.S. lack of moral sensitivity to the plight of its fellow men. A
nation's view of human rights is embodied in its immigration pol-
icy. Insensitivity to human rights violations in El Salvador is indic-
ative of the receding commitment by the United States to help
others in need.
This lack of commitment to human rights is inconsistent with
current immigration law. The Refugee Act of 1980 places "special
humanitarian concerns" as the primary objective of United States
foreign policy. 180 In section 101(a), Congress declared that "it is
the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent
needs of persons subject to prosecution in their homelands, includ-
ing where appropriate, humanitarian assistance for their care and
maintenance. . . of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the
United States . ".'..",I" By ignoring the human rights violations in
El Salvador and prosecuting those persons committed to the his-
toric policy enunciated by Congress, the United States is engaging
in a flagrant disregard for its own laws and its commitment to "hu-
manitarian concerns."
The sanctuary movement initially began as a response to the
huge numbers of displaced Central Americans fleeing oppressive
178. R. DWORKIN, supra note 146, at 220.
179. Gillette, 401 U.S. 437.
180. For example, the term "special humanitarian concern" is referred to at least eleven
times in the act. Amazingly, the act does not define the term anywhere.
181. 8 U.S.C. § 1521(1) (1982).
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political regimes. The movement has entrusted itself with the duty
to preserve the human rights commitment of the Carter adminis-
tration embodied in the Refugee Act of 1980. While it may be said
that both the United States and the sanctuary movement are act-
ing outside the law, the movement is at least attempting to pre-
serve the moral integrity of America.
Tradition instructs us that the proper method for U.S. citizens
to protest government conduct is to effect changes by way of the
voting booth. The courts are unwilling to second guess the execu-
tive branch of the government by making rulings about immigra-
tion affairs during the trials of those who have been accused of
harboring illegal aliens. If American society desires to offer shelter
to fleeing Salvadorans, then that wish will have to be expressed
through the political process, not by way of the courts.
Geralyn Passaro
Janet Phillips*
* Editor's note: this comment is the product of two separately written papers, com-
bined for the purpose of publication.
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